ORDERED that the motion (Seq. #001) by Defendants to disqualify opposing counsel from the joint representation of Plaintiffs is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the cross motion (Seq. #002) by Plaintiffs for partial summary judgment on liability and upon the counterclaims is denied.

DECISION

This case involves a three vehicle collision that occurred on August 14,2013 on Fifth Avenue in the Town of Islip. It is undisputed that Joey Santiago operated a vehicle that struck the rear of the vehicle operated by Plaintiff Leandra Zavala, which then struck the vehicle operated by Nilsa Zavala. Immediately prior to the primary and secondary collisions all three vehicles had been traveling southbound direction in the right lane of two southbound lanes. Plaintiffs uniformly contend in sworn affidavits that both the first and second vehicle were stopped at a stop light at the intersection of Fifth Avenue and Claremont Road when the Defendant, Joey Santiago, struck the second vehicle propelling it into the first vehicle.

Defendant moves to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel from the joint representation of the operator of the first vehicle, NilsaZavala, the operator of the second vehicle, Leandra Zavala, and the passenger in the first vehicle, Melbi Morales. In the first instance, it is for Plaintiffs' counsel to be mindful of the potential conflict of interest between and among clients he jointly represents and to assess whether joint representation is permissible and, if the clients agree, to obtain a waiver of such potential conflict of interest if and when it exists. See Matter of Sacco & Fillas, LLP v David j Broderick, P. C; 133 A.D.3d 862 (2nd Dept. 2015). In this case, all three Plaintiffs have provided sworn affidavits that the first and second vehicle were both stopped at a traffic light when the third vehicle operated by Defendant struck the second vehicle propelling it into the first vehicle. Upon these sworn allegations of the Plaintiffs it is their joint and respective contention that there is no fault in either of the Plaintiff drivers, and that sale responsibility for the accident rests with the Defendant driver alone. Upon these facts the Court can not deny Plaintiffs' right to the counsel of their choice upon an application of the Defendants.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel is denied.

Plaintiffs have cross moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. On this cross motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Defendants, as the nonmoving party, and afford him the benefit of every favorable inference. See Ruiz v Griffin, 7 J AD3d J 112 at J 115; and Franklin v 2 Guys From Long Pond, Inc., 50 AD3d 846. A motion for summary judgment can not be granted where material facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility. See Ruiz v Griffin, 71 AD3d at! 115. Resolving questions of credibility, determining the accuracy of witnesses, and reconciling the testimony of witnesses are for the trier offact. Gille v Long Beach City School Dist., 84 AD3d 1022; Republic Long Is., Inc. v Andrew J Vanacore, Inc., 29 AD3d 665; and Harty v Karnish Distribs., 119 AD2d 729.